During the appeal process, oral arguments were presented to the Mississippi
Supreme Court in an attempt to overturn the Mathis verdict. The following
document is an argument from the appellant, Mathis, explaining why the
conviction should be overturned
"The first point to which I direct attention is the confession
detailed by witness, George Jackson, alleged to have been made to
the witness by Matthis on the morning following the tragedy. Jackson
was not a person of authority, but the record shows plainly that he
obtained Matthis' statement on the inducement held out with great
insistence the he (Jackson) would help Matthis out, and the record
shows that Matthis was very reluctant to talk. This involuntary statement
and confession is the strongest testimony against the prisoner. We
understand that the authorities are in hopeless conflict as to whether
such a statement should be permitted to go to the jury, and this court
has almost held that confessions so made are competent in all cases.
However, we submit, such decisions are wrong and should be overruled.
I cite on this point 6 Am. & Eng. Enc. Law, 563, note 1: Ib.,
526. An offer of assistance to elude prosecution render incompetent
confessions to private persons. Anderson v. State, 104 Ala.,
83.
The court erred in admitting the letters offered in evidence
by the state, because they did not throw any light on the crime, and
if competent in any view, certainly they were not admissible in rebuttal.
They are not competent because Matthis denied writing them, and there
is absolutely no proof that he wrote them.
The third and last point we urge upon the court is the instruction,
No. 4, asked by and given for the state. By this instruction the jury
were limited on the question of reasonable doubt to the competent
evidence in the case. Let us remember that Lester charges Matthis
with the crime, and Matthis lays the crime upon Lester, and much is
left unexplained. Where we are in the dark on so many materials points,
where no motive is shown for the killing by Matthis, the court should
not have limited the jury to the evidence adduced, but should have
told the jury that if they had a reasonable doubt, either arising
from the evidence or from a lack of evidence, they should acquit.
We cannot understand why the state secured this instruction, as it
has been so often condemned by this court; but another thing: the
jury were inferentially called upon to pass upon the competencey of
the testimony, and no doubt in this case the jury were willing to
assumed this duty, which belonged to the court. In passing on this
instruction in the case of Knight v. State, 74 Miss., 140(quoting
from Mr. Freeman's note to Burt v. State, 72 Miss., 408), this
court said: "So it is error to limit a reasonable doubt to something
which is suggested by or arises from or springs out of evidence adduced,
as this gives too narrow a definition of reasonable doubt. Such a
doubt may arise from a want of evidence as to some fact having a natural
connection with the cause. It has reference to that uncertain condition
of mind which may arise after considering what has not been proved,
as well as what has. See also Hale v. State, 72 Miss., 150;
Herman v. State, 75 Miss., 340, and authorities there cited."
